Revaluing Prior Gifts at Death by Harl, Neil E.
Volume 5 | Number 4 Article 1
2-18-1994
Revaluing Prior Gifts at Death
Neil E. Harl
Iowa State University, harl@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Peer Reviewed Articles is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harl, Neil E. (1994) "Revaluing Prior Gifts at Death," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 5 : No. 4 , Article 1.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol5/iss4/1
 Agricultural Law Digest
An Agricultural Law Press Publication Volume 5, No. 4 February 18, 1994
Editor: Robert P. Achenbach, Jr. Contributing Editor Dr. Neil E. Harl, Esq. ISSN 1051-2780
Agricultural Law Digest is published by the Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444, Madison, WI 53705, bimonthly except June and December.  Annual
subscription $100.  Copyright 1994 by  Robert P. Achenbach, Jr. and Neil E. Harl.  No part of this newsletter may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing
from the publisher.  Printed on recycled paper by Accurate Business Service, Madison, WI.
25
REVALUING PRIOR GIFTS AT DEATH
— by Neil E. Harl*
 One result of the 1976 effort unifying the federal estate
and gift tax was that "adjusted taxable gifts" after 1976 are
taken into account in determining cumulative transfers at
death.1 This is the mechanism by which use of any part or
all of the unified estate and gift tax credit during life is
taken into account at death.
A major question that has been repeatedly litigated in
recent years is whether IRS after death can revalue lifetime
gifts falling within the category of adjusted taxable gifts.2
The predominant view emerging from the cases is that IRS
may indeed revalue such gifts even though the period of
time for challenging gift tax liability has expired.3
Adjusted taxable gifts
It is important to note that the term "adjusted taxable
gifts" does not include all gifts made during life. The term
includes gifts made after 1976 and not covered by the
federal gift tax annual exclusion,4 the federal gift tax marital
deduction5 or the federal gift tax charitable deduction.6
Thus, relatively few farm and ranch taxpayers have made
adjusted taxable gifts. In most instances, gifts are covered
by one of the three deductions. However, for those making
major gifts to donees other than the taxpayer's spouse or a
qualifying charity, the question of whether the gift can be
revalued after death may be highly important.
Revaluation for federal gift tax purposes
Under the Internal Revenue Code, a redetermination of
prior gifts is barred for purposes of taxing current gifts if,
with regard to the prior gift — (1) the statute of limitations
has run and (2) a federal gift tax was paid or assessed.7 In
that situation, the prior gift's value is that used as a basis for
payment or assessment of federal gift tax.8 IRS has
explained that the purpose of the statute in question was to
prevent the valuation of a past transfer from being placed in
doubt after IRS had previously been satisfied as to the
correctness of the valuation of the gift.9 It should be noted
that valuations on a no-tax return do not enjoy the same
protection.10
Since use of the unified credit is mandatory,11 failure to
use the available unified credit to cover gifts prevents the
three year statute of limitation from running as to the
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assessment of federal gift tax.12 Inasmuch as few farm and
ranch taxpayers make gifts sufficient in value to use the
unified credit during life, the statute has relatively little
practical effect.
Revaluation for federal estate tax purposes
The question is whether the statute, I.R.C. §
2504(c),which by its terms applies to the federal gift tax,
applies also for federal estate tax purposes.  The federal
estate tax levied at death depends upon the value of
cumulative lifetime transfers as well as the value of
property passing at death.13 The federal estate tax is the tax
on the taxable estate plus "adjusted taxable gifts."14 Thus,
there is no tax imposed at death on adjusted taxable gifts but
adjusted taxable gifts use up the unified credit and move the
estate into higher tax brackets.
In a 1984 ruling,15 the Internal Revenue Service held
that lifetime taxable gifts could be redetermined and
revalued as of the date of the gift even though the
limitations period had expired. The first case to discuss the
issue, Boatmen's First National Bank v. United States,16
held that I.R.C. § 2504(c) was applicable to federal estate
tax computations and that IRS could not revalue lifetime
gifts where gift tax had been paid and the statute of
limitations had run. In a 1990 Tax Court case, Estate of
Smith,17 a divided court upheld the IRS position. Two
subsequent Tax Court cases18 and a U.S. District Court
decision19 also agreed with the IRS position. One of the Tax
Court cases has now been affirmed by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.20
The latest case, Evanson v. United States,21 entered a
summary judgment on the issue in favor of the taxpayer,
thus aligning that court with Boatmen's First National Bank
v. United States,22 and stated —
" ... The issue produces either opposite results or spirited
dissents when presented to different courts. I quite frankly
do not know which is the more rational holding, but feel that
the IRS has more resources for purposes of appeal."
Conclusion
Although the courts are divided, the balance seems to be
shifting toward the IRS view that I.R.C. § 2504(c) does not
apply to the federal estate tax. The lesson is clear: the
valuation of any taxable gifts should be carefully prepared
and dutifully preserved to combat a later assertion that the
property was undervalued.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors sought to avoid a
nonpurchase-money security interest in a handgun claimed
as an exempt household good. The court held that the pistol
was a household good and the lien was avoidable as
impairing the exemption. The court adopted the definition of
“household good” established in In re McGreeny, 955 F.2d
957 (4th Cir. 1992) as goods typically found around the
home and used to facilitate the day-to-day living within the
home. Thus, because a pistol is used in the home for
protection, a pistol was a household good. Matter of
Raines, 161 B.R. 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor sought to avoid a
nonpurchase-money security interest in the debtor’s mobile
home as impairing the debtor’s homestead exemption. The
creditor argued that the mobile home was personal property
not eligible for the homestead exemption. The court held
that the Virginia homestead exemption was broad enough to
include mobile homes; therefore, the exemption would be
allowed and the nonpurchase-money security interest
avoided for impairing the exemption. In re Goad, 161 B.R.
161 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993).
TAX REFUND. The debtors claimed a federal income
tax refund as exempt under the exemption for wages under
Fla. Stat. § 222.11. The court held that the refund was not
eligible for the exemption because the funds were not held
in a bank account to which the debtors had access and the
taxes were not considered wages earned by the debtors. In
re Lancaster, 161 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS had filed a claim for
$207,000 in taxes, penalties and interest owed by the
debtors. The debtors had no assets other than $15,000 in
exempt property and sought to avoid the IRS pre-petition
tax lien to the extent the lien was unsecured. The debtors
argued that Dewsnup v. Timm, 113 S.Ct. 773 (1992) barred
such avoidance only as to consensual liens; therefore, the
nonconsensual tax lien was avoidable to the extent it was
unsecured. The court held that Section 522(c)(2)(ii)(B)
specifically excludes tax liens from avoidance as to exempt
property and that Dewsnup applied to nonconsensual liens,
also. In re Doviak, 161 B.R. 379 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor filed suit against the IRS for
post-discharge levies against the debtor. The IRS argued
that the claims for taxes supporting the levies were
nondischargeable because the debtor failed to file a return
for the tax years involved. As proof of the debtor’s failure to
file, the IRS presented two substitute returns. The court held
that a valid substitute return was prima facie evidence of the
debtor’s failure to file the return, placing the burden on the
debtor to show that a return was filed or that the substitute
return was inaccurate. The court also held that only
substitute returns which are subscribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury are valid for this purpose; therefore, because
one of the substitute returns was not subscribed by the
Secretary, an issue of fact remained as to whether the debtor
had filed a return for that tax year. In re Bank, 161 B.R.
406 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. The debtor had received a
discharge in a Chapter 13 case after paying all claims for
federal income taxes, and the case was closed. However, the
IRS filed liens, made levies and coerced the debtor into
making post-discharge payments on the discharged taxes.
The debtor brought suit to reopen the case and to recover the
excess assessments and resulting costs for the suit. The IRS
claimed the defense of no waiver of sovereign immunity
because the debtor’s suit was not a claim of the bankruptcy
estate. The court held that Section 106(a) provided a waiver
of sovereign immunity only as to claims which were
property of the estate at the commencement of the case or
arising before the case is closed, Sections 541, 1306;
